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6 November - 12 November
1966
By Captain Robert J.
O'Neill MID
While we were
operating along Route 15 in October, we were able to form a
detailed picture of Viet Cong activities along the western
coast of Phuoc Tuy. This area was important for two types of
Viet Cong operations. First a significant amount of traffic
from the Mekong Delta came into Phuoc Tuy via the Rung Sat.
The Viet Cong in Phuoc Tuy needed both supplies and men and
these were available from the heavily populated rice
producing areas within the Fourth Corps area. They could be
loaded onto small sampans which could pass swiftly and
inconspicuously through the maze of narrow channels which
led to the Phuoc Tuy coast. Second, the Chau Duc District
Company was active along the western coast and on Long Son
Island to the south. This company had been recruited from
the island and from several villages along Route 15 and so
one of its main functions was to exert as much control over
these areas as possible. Another important function was to
assist with transfer of supplies which had been brought from
the Mekong Delta from the landing points to the bases inland
close to the hills. Now that we had struck at some of these
bases, it seemed opportune to attack these landing points
and harass the activities of the Chau Duc District Company.
Long Son
Island was situated near the junction of several sea
channels, some of which led into the Rung Sat to the west
and two channels which led into the Phuoc Tuy coast. Thus
the island was a natural staging post and a small landing
jetty had built on the north-western tip, Ben Da. Most of
the population of the island lived on the eastern shore, in
a well constructed village which nestled at the foot of Nui
Nua, an abrupt but smooth-sided grassy hill rising to six
hundred feet and dominating the island. Three-quarters of
the island lay to the west of Nui Nua and the Viet Cong had
converted this area into a training and rest area controlled
by the platoon of the Chau Duc District Company which was
stationed on the island. The area between Nui Nua and Ben Da
was a plain, two miles long by one mile wide, broken by a
long ridge that ran north-south a little to the west of the
half-way point between the western coast and Nui Nua. The
ridge ascended to two hundred and fifty feet and was covered
by low scrub. Officially no people lived to the west of Nui
Nua for the Government had ordered all the inhabitants to
live in the main village which could be kept under some form
of control by the local Popular Forces Platoon. However,
some inhabitants of the island had not complied and had
remained in the area used by the Viet Cong. This defeated
the Government programme for making the western end of Long
Son Island into an area that any persons sighted from the
air could be engaged by artillery or strafing, on the
grounds their being in a prohibited area and hence aiding
the Viet Cong, if not actually Viet Cong themselves.
The eastern
settlement, Long Son village, housed several hundred people
in white plastered brick houses which lined narrow sandy
streets. Most of the houses were set in yards and amongst
trees which gave the village an appearance of softness and
coolness. In the centre of the village was the largest
pagoda in Phuoc Tuy. Much of the pagoda had been built in
the mid-nineteenth century, before the arrival of the French
in the south. Steep red tiled roofs descended to curling
eaves which swept upwards in semi circular curves. Bright
blue porcelain dragons breathed fire and arched their backs
from the crests of roofs. Small chapels rose above each
other in low towers linked to the main building by high
gangways. The interior of the pagoda and market bore witness
of their construction to the former importance of the island
as a holy place and the wealth which had thereby flowed to
the island. The main part of the pagoda contained several
small chapels, each with alters of teak, inlaid with mother
of pearl, and decorated with candle holders and vases of
hand worked silver. Huge tables with tops of polished teak
planks two inches thick stood by the walls with paintings of
local scenes. The market was a vast structure, approximately
one hundred feet by forty, with a high, steeply pitched roof
supported by columns of teak. The redbrick floor blended
with the weathered teak of the columns and the teak beams of
the roof. These two buildings were to us the most impressive
in the entire province.
Running
forward to the east from the village was a long narrow spit
over a mile long. A deep drainage canal with high banks ran
for a few hundred yards along the northern side of this
spit, linking the village to a sickle-shaped arm of the sea
which curved on through half a mile of mangroves. Fishing
boats and sampans were moored in the canal, which formed the
main harbour of the village. At the mouth of the canal a
special landing post served the Government outpost which
stood on the spit at the head of the channel to the open
sea. The outpost was a small quadrangle of fortifications,
surmounted by a tower and distinguished by a flagpole flying
the gold and red flag of the South Vietnamese Republic. The
quadrangle was surrounded by several fences of barbed wire
and by minefields set amongst flooded ground from which
occasional mud banks protruded. Thirty village men defended
the fort and endeavoured to exert the authority of the
Government over the island.
The Viet Cong
had not been seriously threatened by this smaller force and
had established a machine gun post and observation point on
the summit of Nui Nua. From this point they watched over the
activities of the village and the Government platoon. If
these men attempted to patrol around the northern or
southern sides of the hill, they were fired on from the
summit. Provided that they kept within close proximity to
the village, they were not molested. In the face of superior
forces, the Government platoon could do little else but
comply with this policy of divided control over the island
We began to
consider the possibilities of an operation on Long Son
Island in August, but the priorities of our other
commitments had compelled the postponement of the idea until
November. However, the months between August and November
were very useful for conducting aerial reconnaissance over
the island, without arousing direct suspicions of our
intentions because the reconnaissances' could be conducted
from the heavily used air corridor from Vung Tau to Saigon.
After a few flights over the island, it was possible to
select sites for the battalion headquarters, search areas
for the companies and helicopter landing zones. Close
liaison with the Vietnamese naval patrols which worked
around the island in small boats in the hours of darkness
enabled us to know the degree of use which the Viet Cong
were making of the island and the points at which their
sampans usually called.
In order to
catch the Viet Cong on the island before they had time to
disappear into the surrounding mangroves, the whole
battalion had to be landed on the island within a very short
space of time and at widely separated points, so that the
companies could spread out and cover the whole of the Viet
Cong area. At the same time, a seal had to be placed between
the village and the remainder of the island so that the Viet
Cong could not disappear into the village. The only way to
get the troops onto the island was by air for a sea approach
would have been slowed down by the mangroves around the
island. However we could we could obtain the services of
only one American helicopter company of ten aircraft which
could lift seventy men in one load. To have lifted the
battalion direct from Nui Dat to the island would have taken
twenty minutes for each seventy men, thus spreading the
concentration of the battalion over several hours, allowing
for refueling pauses. This would have robbed the operation
of any surprise and the Viet Cong would have been given
sufficient time to flee from the force which had made the
first landing and so escape. Alternatively, it was possible
that the first men on the ground could encounter superior
Viet Cong forces, if they happened to arrive at a time when
a Viet Cong battalion was resting there. Thus the delays in
reinforcing them from Nui Dat was unacceptable.
Consequently
the battalion had to be assembled at some point on the
mainland as close as possible to the island, from which it
could be flown in, taking less than ten minutes for each
round trip by the helicopters. The next problem was how to
concentrate the battalion on the mainland opposite the
island without making it perfectly obvious to the Viet Cong
that the island was our goal, long before we had begun to
land on it. This difficulty could be overcome by commencing
the operation by the cordon of a village on Route 15 which
was conveniently situated with respect to the island. The
battalion could concentrate after the cordon, and instead of
flying back to Nui Dat
or some other part, descend on the island.
One of the
major Viet Cong tracks into the interior of Phuoc Tuy was
the one which crossed the low ground between the Dinh hills
and Nui Toc Tien. This track began at Phuoc Hoa, a village
of five hundred people on Route 15, and very close to Long
Son island. Phuoc Hoa possessed one of the best harbours on
the western coast and it was known that the village played
an important part in the Viet Cong supply system. We had
specific information concerning the identities of several of
the Viet Cong who lived in Phuoc Hoa and so a cordon of the
village seemed to be a worthwhile project.
In September
we received indications that the Viet Cong were expecting us
to go to the island in the near future. Some bar girls in
Vung Tau had been asking our men when we were going to
operate against the Viet Cong on the island. It was known
that some of these bar girls were in the pay of the Viet
Cong so the girls represented a ready made earpiece through
which we could feed misleading information to the Viet Cong.
Because the Viet Cong had some idea that the island was
possibly one of our goals it was important to attempt to
give them the notion that although we might be operating
near Route 15 in the near future, these operations would not
involve the island. Four seasoned members of the battalion
were chosen to go to Vung Tau and to spread a cover plan by
discussing the plan discretely yet somewhat unguardedly
amongst themselves in circumstances where barmen or
waitresses might overhear. The men went in pairs at
different times and moved at random through several bars
which were thought to be suitable for our purpose. According
to our cover plan the battalion was going out along Route 15
and from there were striking north into the western part of
the Dinh hills.
Colonel Warr's plan
for cordoning of Phuoc Hoa was to move the battalion out to
Long Cat on Route 15, one mile south of Phuoc Hoa, then to
walk inland into the cover of scrub where a harbour area
would be formed. Once night had fallen, the battalion would
then move in an arc around to the west to meet the cart
track which ran back into Phuoc Hoa from the gap between Nui
Toc Tien and the Dinh hills. This cart track was an
excellent navigational aid and the battalion could then move
into and surround Phuoc Hoa in the cover of darkness.
Unfortunately the sea front of the village could not be
covered by a land cordon, but the assistance of the Special
Air Service Squadron in supplying men in assault boats made
a sea cordon possible. After the cordon, the battalion was
to move off towards the Dinh hills, stopping for the night
at the edge of a large clearing from which we could fly to
the island at dawn on the following morning.
The cordon of
Phuoc Hoa, Operation Yass, was scheduled for the night of
November 6th/7th, and the landing on long Son Island,
Operation Hayman, was to be on the morning of November 8th.
By fortunate coincidence the Chief of Long Le District,
Captain Kim, in whose district the island lay, was making a
visit to the Popular Forces platoon on November the 4th in
order to pay them for the month. This visit offered an
excellent opportunity for finding out at first hand about
recent Viet Cong activities and strength on the island. Kim
had invited me to go with him but I was troubled by the
possibility of my presence on Long Son arousing the
suspicions of the Viet Cong so soon before an operation, for
they could easily disappear to the mainland for a week if
they thought my visit presaged the anticipated Australian
landing on the island.
Fortunately a
cover plan was available. On November the 4th we were to
receive a visit from Sir Wilfred Kent Hughes around the area
of Nui Dat and as one of my functions was to brief and
escort visitors to the battalion I was detailed to show Sir
Wilfred around the area of Nui Dat and whatever Government
controlled areas he wished to see. If I were to visit Long
Son as escort to Sir Wilfred and if we were to ask a few
casual questions while we were on the island, there seemed a
good chance that not even the local garrison nor Captain Kim
would connect the visit with a possible operation in the
near future. I put the problem to Sir Wilfred and he agreed
to help us, so we set sail with Captain Kim and a platoon of
his troops from a naval station on the Vung Tau peninsula on
the afternoon of November 4th.
We travelled
in two medium sized landing craft of the Vietnamese navy
which churned along through the broad channels between the
mangroves at twelve knots. Each craft were armed with
several machine guns mounted on the gunwales behind armour
plate shields. The trip was considered to be perfectly safe,
but no chances were taken lest an ambush had been laid along
one of the narrower channels which were used to avoid the
detours made by the wide meanders of the broad reaches.
After nearly two hours on the water we wound our way into
the narrow curving arm which led up to the island landing
point by the fort.
The local
soldiers were a curious sight for their religion required
them to wear their hair long and fastened in a bun behind
their heads. This long hair and the smoothness of their
skins confused my determination of their sex for a few
moments. Instead of green uniforms they wore long black
robes, rather like cassocks. They were in good spirits for
not only was it pay day, but the Viet Cong had only some
twenty men on the island at that time and so they felt
reasonably secure. The Viet Cong had sent a few bursts of
machine gun fire into the fort from the top of Nui Nua a few
days previously as a type of psychological warfare, but they
had hit no one. The main force battalion had used the island
for a rest centre since our arrival at Nui Dat so it was
unlikely that our landing would meet with substantial
opposition.
We had to
wait an hour while the American medical team which had
accompanied Captain Kim attend the villagers. The monks at
the pagoda were keen to show us around when they learned
that an Australian VIP was visiting, so we passed the
time in going from chapel to chapel, ascending and
descending dark teak staircases, and walking apprehensively
along the high gangways which spanned the chasms of tiles
between the upper chapels. Captain Kim departed late in the
afternoon, at a time which afforded us some splendid views
of the setting sun behind the island and of crimson
reflections in the long reaches of dark water which settled
quickly to calm after our passage.
On the
afternoon before the cordon, while travelling along Route
15, Major Miller noticed a portable wire barrier, festooned
with grenades, standing by the main gate of Phuoc Hoa. If
the APC's hit this barrier as they drove into Phuoc Hoa at
dawn on the following morning some casualties make have been
caused. However, it was possible that the barrier was not
placed across the gateway at night and so
Major Miller paid
a visit to the village chief just at dusk on the pretext of
announcing a visit by an Australian medical team on the
following day. He saw that the gate was not blocked by the
barrier and so the APC's were able to enter the village the
next morning without any hindrance.
CONTINUE
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