(Cont'd)

6 November - 12 November 1966

By Captain Robert J. O'Neill MID

The movement into the cordon position at Phuoc Hoa took place smoothly. There were no attempts to break out of the cordon and when A Company entered the village at dawn after our interpreters had broadcast instructions, the collection of the villagers took only a few hours. During A Company's search of the village, a few young men tried to make a break for cover into the surrounding paddy fields but they were speedily apprehended by the cordoning companies The men and women of Viet Cong military age, i.e. from 12 to 45 years, were taken by truck into Ba Ria for questioning by the provincial security teams. The deception plan for moving inland from Long Cat must have been effective for five Viet Cong and eleven suspects were picked out in Ba Ria, together with several deserters and draft dodgers.

In the late afternoon, the battalion moved off by companies to form a harbour area one mile to the west of Phuoc Hoa. We had not left much time for this move and we ran into difficulties in finding the correct landing zone for there were several very similar areas close to each other. The situation was not helped when some of the APC's who were accompanying us to assist with the defence of the harbour area became bogged in thick black greasy mud. The vehicles had broken through the dry crust of several inches covering a vast plain of mud caused by the water flowing off the Dinh hills which had not time to drain away.

We made a hurried camp for the night and stood to at dusk by shells crapes sufficient to give minimal protection in the event of a mortar bombardment or an attack from the hills which overlooked us. After half an hour of darkness, we stood down and the normal night of sentries on all the machine guns took over our protection until the battalion commenced the morning stand to, half an hour before first light. We had to be ready to move at first light for the helicopters had been arranged to lift the battalion onto the island before the inhabitants had time to move out of their houses and see us coming.

The landing was preceded by a short artillery bombardment of the areas which threatened the landing zones. B, C, and D Companies were to land on the crest of the southern ridge of Nui Nua and then spread out so that C Company covered the south central part of the island, B Company covered the north central part and D Company went into the village and searched it. A Company was to land near the north-western tip of the island to prevent any Viet Cong who were near Ben Da from escaping to the mainland. Battalion Headquarters was to land on the eastern side of the ridge across the western part of the island. The size of the operation had grown since the original conception   for C Company of the Sixth Battalion landed with us, and the Special Air Service Squadron surrounded the island in small assault boats to cut off any escape by sea for the Viet Cong and to search the mangroves for hiding places. Because of these additional units which were not part of the Fifth Battalion, Brigadier Jackson decided that this would be a good opportunity to deploy the Task Force Headquarters in a forward role for the first time. After the Battalion Headquarters had flown in, several large Chinook helicopters lifted in the Task Force Headquarters which occupied an area immediately north of the battalion Headquarters

The bombardment of the landing zones was planned by Major Gaire and carried out by the gunners of  103 Field Battery, during the several minutes before the helicopters were due to land the troops. The helicopter commander had made a reconnaissance of the island from the air with Colonel Warr several days previously and they had agreed on a flight path for the helicopters landing on Nui Nua which would sweep around to the east in a wide curve so that they would not cross the line of fire from the guns at Long Cat when they were firing their preparatory bombardment. It was fortunate that the whole landing and bombardment was being controlled from a command helicopter containing Colonel Warr, Major Gaire and myself, for the first flight of helicopters flew straight across the path of the shells which were still being fired. Major Gaire immediately stopped the bombardment and no mishaps occurred. Colonel Warr discussed the problem with the commander of the helicopter company who was one of the pilots of our helicopter and further danger was averted.

As soon as the troops, most of B Company, landed on the long ridge they came under machine gun fire from the summit of Nui Nua. One of the helicopters had the misfortune to strike its rotor blades on one of the large rocks which were strewn over the steeply sloping landing zone. The rotor shattered and the turbine burst into flame. No one was seriously injured but the helicopter was a wreck. It was particularly difficult for the Americans to salvage because the main rotor shaft had been completely shattered. When a helicopter had to be recovered after a mishap the normal method of lifting it out was to use a Chinook with an attachment which grasped the main rotor shaft to lift the disabled aircraft. However, they were determined not to leave it behind and after much trouble it was suspended from slings around and through its body and lifted out by one of the larger helicopters.

While D Company were searching the area of the village, the other companies had several minor contacts with the Viet Cong. B Company moved forward on the enemy machine gun post on the hilltop, but the Viet Cong made a swift retreat and escaped to the thick bush on the central plain. C Company encountered several enemy in the south-western part of the island, and A Company found many installations which had been used by the Viet Cong for living and storage of supplies. There were several indications that some of the Viet Cong were trapped on the island and so a series of co-ordinated sweeps was organized to flush them into the open.

These sweeps were controlled by Major Stan Maizey who was filling Max Carroll's place as S3 while Max was taking his five days leave in Hong Kong. This was one of the few opportunities which Stan had had to escape the administrative cares which made up the greater part of his work as the battalion second in command. He had commanded several forces of two companies which had been mounted by the battalion for special operations, namely assistance for the Sixth battalion when they were doing the first search of Long Tan and then road clearing operations to the village of Long Hai. This village on the eastern coast of Phuoc Tuy looking onto the Vung Tau peninsula had been a resort used by the Diem family. Stan had also been in command of A Company during Operation Holsworthy at Binh Ba when Major Cassidy had been ill. However, these were small compensations for the months he had sent in base. Furthermore, he was due to leave the battalion in January to take over from Major Richard- Hannigan at Task Force Headquarters as the senior operations staff officer, so it was important that he had the experience of controlling the operations of one of the two battalions which would shortly be under his direction.

As the pressure of the searching companies on the Viet Cong increased, several enemy attempted to hide in the mangroves or to get to the mainland in motorized sampans. Clashes involving chiefly B and D Companies on the northern side of the island took place. Combined manoeuvring of the men in the assault boats and the men on the land, directed by helicopters, resulted in the deaths of ten Viet Cong and the capture of three for no casualties to ourselves. However, when B Company began to move back to the south to link up with C Company, a Viet Cong sniper killed Private Watson, a member of Four Platoon. Snipers had been bothering the headquarters on a few occasions, but their fire was so wild that no casualties were caused. It was simply the matter of one man creeping up towards the perimeter which was manned by the support company platoons, hurriedly loosing a few rounds without taking careful aim before he dashed away to avoid the return fire from the perimeter.

The operation finished with the closure of the sweeps on November 12th. We did not eliminate all the Viet Cong on the island, but the process had begun. Several families who lived on the western side of Nui Nua had to be resettled back in Long Son village so the western side of the island could be fired on occasionally to discourage the Viet Cong from attempting to rebuilt their destroyed buildings and re-establish the island as an important link for supplies coming in from the west. The most significant indication of the degree of success of the operation was received a few days after we had gone when the remaining thirteen Viet Cong on the island crossed to Vung Tau in sampans and gave themselves up to the Vietnamese police. It seemed that Long Son Island was now at peace.

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