(Cont'd)

18 February - 22 February 1967

Captain Robert J O'Neill MID

Colonel Warr ordered B Company, now commanded by Lieutenant Pott of Six Platoon, and the APC's to remain stationary until a relieving force of A Company and a team of sappers had arrived. Major Carroll was ordered to move through B Company with the greatest caution and to assume command of the group for the night. After a tense three-hour approach, during which several clusters of 'Jumping Jack' mines were discovered, A Company reached the remnant of B Company and Major Carroll organized a combined harbour for the night.

While this drama had been taking place the Task Force Headquarters had been busy in reaction to another threat. The headquarters of 275 Regiment had moved southwards from its earlier location and was now provocatively close to the boundary of the Task Force area of responsibility, ten miles to the east of Nui Dat. The movements of the Commander of the Fifth Viet Cong Division also indicated an interest in operations close to Nui Dat, while 274 Regiment, which had been dormant since December, was in a position to participate in a divisional assault on the Task Force base. Consequently, with reluctance, Brigadier Graham had decided on the afternoon of February 21st that we would have to return to Nui Dat. Captain Goodwin of the of the Task Force operations staff flew out to the new Battalion Headquarters and discussed the move with Colonel Warr. After some calculating, the time for the air lift back to Nui Dat was fixed at 10 a.m. B and D Companies were to go by helicopter while the remainder of the battalion were to move by road in trucks and APC's. Everyone regretted the need for this decision after we had taken such a heavy blow. It was important for the morale of the battalion to carry the operation through to a successful conclusion rather then to be pulled out just when we had taken a beating. However, the security of Nui Dat was the sine qua non of our operations in Vietnam and so it had to take first place.

Just before 9 p.m., Major Carroll reported some lights up on the northern slope of Hon Vung which overlooked the area in which the explosions had taken place. Artillery fire was directed onto the hillside by Captain Tony Wales, the New Zealand forward observations officer with A Company. It seemed as if some men were in a cave whose entrance passage had a bend several feet from the cave mouth. Around this bend was the main chamber which was lit. A blanket over the entrance to this chamber was blowing aside from time to time, and the red glare of a fire inside the cave was being reflected onto the wall of the entrance passage. It was this flickering red glow which A company had seen and it took some little while to work out what was causing it. The artillery fire was very accurate and Major Burge, who had taken over command of 103 Battery in November, laid on an extensive fire plan. The success of the artillery was illustrated to all of us at the foot of the hills when the hillside was illuminated by a secondary explosion set off by on of the shells. It must have struck a trip flare indicating that the target was a well defended Viet Cong base. Further shelling produced a chain of small secondary explosions as caches of small arms ammunition were detonated. The weight of the artillery fire was increased by the eight inch guns from Nui Dat, which shifted their fire up and down the slope with fine precision. The target looked such a promising one that an air strike was arranged for the following morning.

During the first part of the morning of February 22nd, the companies had begun to concentrate at the Battalion Headquarters location. A Company found an anti-tank mine on the track which they followed out of the danger area. The mine was successfully defused. The APC which had been blown up by the first mine was a complete write off, so its frame was stripped of anything useful to us or to the Viet Cong and it was then burnt with petrol. At 9.35 a.m. the strike onto the Hon Vung caves began. A mixture of high explosive and napalm descended onto the rocks, the napalm trickling down into the caves and burning where the blast of high explosives could not reach.

The battalion reassembled at Nui Dat at 1 p.m. and prepared special precautions for an attack on the base. We then began a series of Company patrols through the area surrounding Nui Dat which lasted until the next major operation, preventing us from going back into the Long Hai hills to settle the score with whoever remained in the southern part. The only troops to return to the hills were a patrol of the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit, a specialised team of Vietnamese, trained in long range reconnaissance, advanced field craft and sabotage. This patrol was commanded by Captain John Leggett, an Australian who was attached to the Provincial Headquarters. It was a courageous feat for twenty lightly armed men to enter this Viet Cong base and their audacity was repaid by the result. They found two Viet Cong guarding the caves on the steep hillside one of whom they killed while the other fled. In the caves they found three Claymore mines, two other anti-personnel mines, ten Chinese communist grenades, one thousand rounds of Soviet 7.92 mm. rifle ammunition, and one 60mm mortar bomb. The area had been devastated by the air strike and the artillery. The .50 calibre machine guns of the APC's which had fired directly into the mouth of the illuminated cave on the night of February 21st had been particularly accurate.

However, Operation Renmark continued in the minds of many for two of the casualties, Major McQualter and Lieutenant Carruthers, were fighting for their lives in hospital. Despite severe head and body injuries, each man held onto life with great tenacity. Lieutenant Carruthers died on February 24th and Major McQualter died at 5 a.m. on March 5th. After the loses at An Nhut these further casualties were a great blow. Altogether we had lost seven killed and twenty-two wounded in the Long Hai hills. The personal impact of the loss of these close friends and comrades made itself deeply felt. The losses also went a long way towards obliterating the notion of immortality which tends to influence the thinking of optimistic soldiers after some time in battle.
 

Webmaster's Note: Read the interview given by Tony White concerning the Long Hai Hills Incident Here

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