© Bob
Cavill
C Company & Assault Pioneers |
 |
For many of us, there are images that swirl about in the ether
of the mind's old memories section that can unexpectedly push
into consciousness often prompted by innocent comment or a
seemingly unrelated incident. Other times they can come
forward in the quite reflective moments one often finds when
alone in those high quiet places
For some it may be echoes of the sound
track that often accompanied incidents experienced by infantry; brief seconds
of violence stamped and reinforced by sound, the sudden
shift from silence to chaos turmoil and rapid action. Sound
levels that must be experienced for they cannot be
described. Sounds that are not so much heard as felt.
Others re-live the distinctive flash and
rippling impact of falling shells—that unconquerable
urge to go down, down to find the comfort of the red damp
clinging clay. Or the slow creeping crump of the mortar; its
sinister searching advance, both can bring an intense
feeling of helplessness, a sensation best known and only
truly understood by the infantry.
But I will give you the image of a figure
in dim light and low mist, an image that has returned to me
often down through 40 years. Sometimes when driving alone at
night on dark country roads he comes... or at that drift
point on the edge of sleep he returns, always the same.... I
step forward he backs then turns. Runs, swift and small into
the mist and a little prickly heat of fear takes me again.
Less often with the years, almost like a friend he comes now
...not the bare legged spectre he was in the early years
when he first appeared before me in July 1966. For in those
30 seconds I was twice reprieved.
Operation Sydney Two: The cordon and search of Duc MY
The morning 19-20 July C Company
The 5th Battalion having left its assembly
position (west) to approach the Village of Duc My. The
platoon roped together by toggle ropes, or hands on
shoulders to overcome the pitch blackness arrived at its
intended jump-off position sometime before first light. 8
platoon with my section (6) were placed into a blocking
position west of the village boundary. In line abreast (a
skirmish line) we were signalled to rise and advance
foreword some little distance closer to the edge of the
village. We rose and drifted though the grey light and
dripping forest. A ground hugging mist had formed as
moisture found its dew point in the cool moist tropical air.
In silence, ghost like, we moved as though born out of that
grey foggy silence. It must have been a fearful sight for
those with a need to escape, as we closed the last door out
of 'Duc My' that day.
After we had
moved some little distance in this line abreast formation
and
due to the poor light and not paying attention, I started to
lose contact with the man on my left and got to far forward
of the rest of my section. On finding I had to move left to
avoid an obstacle in front of me I stepped
sideways and then became aware that there appeared to be the
shadowy outline of a figure in front of me. I thought to
myself someone has stuffed up here! Someone has obviously
lost his spacing in the line and has got into position in
front of me. This decided, I attempted to move further left
in order to pass but the figure jerked backwards and I
realised he was facing me with the outline of a weapon and the
distinct shape of what looked like a thin bladed bayonet
quite high to the left. I could see its outline clearly
against the dawn light of the eastern sky (as I can see it
still to this day). It was only at this point that I
realised this figure was not one of my own section! He
ran and I yelled out "VC!" and went to ground but, I did not
fire for he was rapidly out of sight and I still could
not quiet believe what had just happened.
I yelling VC had put
my section or platoon To the ground in an extremely
nervous condition. In fact they were now in a state of mind
to fire on anything that moved in front of them. At this
stage either the Section Commander Cpl Curly Koblitz (or the
platoon commander I cannot remember who called out "who called
out— what's going on?—who called out!?" I answered, "I
think I saw one enemy moving away to my front." Curly Koblitze then said.
"Did anyone else see anything!?"
My
position within the section normally being next behind the
gun group (Number 1 of the Rifle Group), my section Gunner (Probably J
D
Allen) was near me some 10 metres or so away, then answered saying,
"Someone went down there!—I am covering someone just there
to my right front!" (In my mind the image puts the gunner on
my left he should have been on my right!) The voice
of authority then called out "where are you? Put up your
arm." I raised my arm, only to be told later (at Duc My)
by the gunner "Jesus Bob that was close, how did you get
so far foreword—I almost let you have it back there
Cavill!" A little while later we heard firing from the
village, it would seem one enemy soldier had jumped down into
a trench in front of a B Company soldier and had not been so
lucky as when his comrade found himself in front of me. Several other VC, finding themselves trapped, had then
surrendered.
I have been told
since by a another member of 8 Platoon that he thought I had
ran back a few paces before going to ground. If this was so
it would have made J D Allen even more nervous because he
would have distrusted any figure suddenly moving out of the
gloom towards him from his front. For the combat soldier
whether it is in town, field or forest, the unconfirmed target
is a terrible conundrum. If he does not fire and the target
is the enemy, he may live only just long enough to regret it
for in close quarter fighting the law of the quick and the
dead still applies. Simply put, in order to give the target
the benefit of doubt, you must in fact risk your own life.
I did not thank J D Allen for not pulling the trigger and
ending my life that day at Duc My ... for he lost his own
some months after the battalion's return in a car
accident 1967.
The Bayonet
The image of the
bayonet troubled me for over 20 years. It seems counter to
common sense that an enemy soldier while trying to escape
would encumber himself by placing a bayonet on his rifle .I
have constantly asked myself did I actually see this
bayonet!, or was it just the effect of fear and imagination,
were my eyes playing tricks in the dim light, was the
bayonet folded along the barrel etc.
Real or imagined the
image of the bayonet had come to represent all my negative
experiences of the war. Survivors guilt, pain for the
loss of a close friend and the consequent accumulated
feelings of betrayal common to the Vietnam Veterans' after
the war. All these feelings were now concentrated—were
focused on this image of the SKS, (or possibly Garand)
bayonet. Controlling and learning to live with this image
was the key to my recovery and the return to my former
positive thinking, self reliant and extraverted character. That young man that had rightly marched proudly
through the streets of Sydney in 1966 simply to help stop
one group of people forcing their will upon another.
Uc Dai Loi
Stoush on the Sui Da Bang!
Of course all
will have memories from their respective tours where they
believe fate or luck must have given them a hand. In the
case of 8 platoon many of us were fortunate to survive what
today would be called an 'incident'. When my own section (6)
was separated from the platoon and caught on the opposite
side of a creek during an accidental clash with another 5th
Battalion platoon, (Possibly D Company). Recent information has
placed the incident around the last two weeks of August 1966.
During a patrol, 6 Section 8 Platoon, were ordered to secure the opposite
bank of a platoon re-supply water point on a creek probably the Sui Da
Bang (Sui means creek), somewhere east of Binh Ba. Which is
located some five kilometres north of 1ATF (1st Australian
Task Force). The area was scrubby with low small trees
and a thin canopy. Country that was always uncomfortably hot
.The rifle group having crossed this fairly deep and wide
creek around1. 5 metres at this point.
6 section's gun group—L/Cpl M Claydon and J Lehman, also having followed Darryl McCombe
and myself, were ordered to go further forward as pickets
(sentries). On doing so we heard movement in
front of us. Moving up nervously through the thick cover we
saw and recognised two of our own people. (I believe D or
possibly B Company setting up!) About 30 metres or so away they looked
relaxed just sitting there. I think I remember an
M60
machine gun
grounded on its bi-pod. Puzzled by this and thinking they
must be from another platoon of my own company, the
question was 'how was it they were here on this side of this
creek? In hindsight—and given their proximity, I should
have made them aware of our position but yelling or calling
out was so alien to me by this time I thought I would just
withdraw and report the situation to Sgt Mavin who was, at
that time, in command of 8 Platoon.
Darryl McCombe
and I started slowly to withdraw but we had gone no more
than about 20 metres or so when they (or other D Company soldiers
that we may not have seen), must have either seen movement,
or heard us. Suddenly hearing something metallic (perhaps
the cocking of the M60) I immediately went flat to ground.
Pte McCombe had not heard anything but observing my
rapid movement to the prone position he promptly went
down to one knee. This decision probably saved his life
because at that instant the M60 opened fire from about 60-70
metres or so behind us. The machine gun raked and tore at the
surrounding shrubbery as it determinedly swept the area that
we and our section were in for what seemed an eternity but
was probably only about 5-10 seconds or so. This might
appear a short period of time to those not familiar with
such things, but believe me, this is a 'lifetime.' Suddenly
the machine gun stopped. I have since been informed by R Quinn
of C
Company, that the D Company gunner had a stoppage! Though at least
section strength rifle fire continued, we were badly exposed
and the platoon being split by the creek along with our
machine gun group it was decided to make a rapid tactical
withdrawal back across the creek to link with the rest of
our platoon. It would appear the D Company platoon, no doubt
thinking they had the bastards' on the run, (and they did!)
aggressively started to move up because bullets soon started
coming into the creek area. Though we tried to cover the gun
group from the opposite bank as they crossed L/Cpl Claydon
being almost the last across was badly exposed and ducked or
fell beneath the water. On exiting the creek and returning
fire his rifle suffered a water hammer and exploded in his
face slightly damaging his eyes. Neither side could see each
other. 8 Platoon being now united, the two platoons began to
exchange very heavy fire. During the contact and finding myself
near Sgt 'Shorty' Mavin, I tried yelling at him that I thought
we were in contact with our own people. However being under
tremendous pressure and unable to hear me due to the two
platoons horrendous exchange of fire, he just kept
signalling me to return fire using the
M79. I did not obey
the order shaking my head in refusal. He, not knowing the
reason why, frustrated him immensely ... he was not
impressed! At about this point the D Company platoon, no doubt
finding its foreword elements running into very strong
resistance, attempted to hold us in position while, with
probably two sections, started moving to our left flank. (these were an aggressive pack of Ds) As they come round to
our left Sgt Mavin ordered all three sections of 8 Platoon to
withdraw and take up positions along a nearby cart track
some 30 to 50 metres or so away to our left. I remember most men
rolling sideways or crawling the last 10 metres or so into the
drain. (to stand at this stage would have been unwise!) He
quickly put two sections up to face directly what he thought
was this new direction of attack. As many in the platoon
would know, Shorty Maven and myself were not too fond
of each other but I do remember him standing up
firing and waving his arms directing his men effectively
during this withdrawal to the cart track. Both sides of the
track were relatively clear, so anyone breaking out into the
open area along the edge of the cart track would have been
met by a withering fire from the two sections now facing
them.
Leaving the original position along the creek bank was a
smart move on Shorty Mavin's part, it left the
holding force now firing ineffectively into our vacated old
positions along the creek edge. The cart track on the other
hand afforded dead ground in the form of shallow dish drains. From these muddy banks and gutters we waited.
Most were
firing but within half a minute or so were ordered to cease
fire! Then we heard the other platoons' orders to
'cease-fire' being shouted. Fortunately some moments
after that they stopped .... the silence was deafening. It
had stopped as quickly as it had started.
It was "all quiet
on the on the Sui Da Bang"
HARD TIMES
The cease-fire was apparently
prompted via both units thinking they must be in
contact
with a main force enemy unit and requesting "Sheldrake"
(Artillery support) while giving the same map co-ordinates!
Amazingly with the exception 8 Platoon's L/Cpl M Claydon who's
SLR Rifle exploded in his face slightly damaging his eyes,
there appeared to be no other injuries to both platoons. We
were somewhat shaken by the experience of being on the
receiving end of a platoon strength assault and particularly
the M 60Machine Guns. It was by some miracle that Pte McCombe was not hit in the initial contact
as both he and I
were initially the most dangerously exposed to the initial
machine gun. He the more so for not going down to the fully prone position. Cpl Claydon and the 8 Platoon Gun Group were also
fortunate not to be hit while crossing the creek.
Fortunately my impending Court Marshal for 'Conduct
Unbecoming', for refusing a direct order to engage the 'enemy' was
at that stage cancelled .
Strangely enough after the event the men of 8 Platoon were
not that angry about what they referred to as a stuff-up.
There was more a feeling of embarrassment along with an
immense relief that no one had been killed given the amount
of ammunition that had been expended, and many lessons were
no doubt learned from this. These were early days in the
Australian commitment to the Vietnam War but the rapid speed
and aggression showed by the D Company platoon against what they
supposed to be a strong enemy force was in the best
traditions of the Australian Army. It shows the reputation
for élan in battle their fathers and grandfathers had gained
and were renowned for in over 100 years that these men intended
to uphold. 8 Platoon in their turn had manoeuvred as a
cohesive unit and showed great tactical flexibility along
with a determination to face what they saw as an aggressive
attack by what was most likely a main force NVA unit. This
aggression allied to high degree of field craft and tactical
discipline is why, in a very short time the VC and the NVA
came to regard the Uc Dai Loi soldiers as being a very
effective and extremely dangerous opponent in the field.
I believe D Company carried no fault in the incident above,
the error was probably in 8 Platoon crossing the creek, it
would appear the Sui Da Bang was selected on the map to
divide the two platoons patrol areas, not taking into
account the necessity to secure both sides of a water point
(this a standard tactical necessity at water-points) Three
things are learned from this particular incident. It
reinforces the critical impotence of map reading and
navigational skills within patrolling infantry sub units.
And training in these skills down to platoon and section
levels cannot be over emphasised ... And don't go sneaking
up on D Company!
In the two incidents above can be seen the effects of
caution. In the cordon of Duc My, my own caution most
probably allowed an enemy soldier to escape. In the 6
section Gunner's caution, at Duc My (Probably J.D.Allen)
given the range, my own life was undoubtedly saved. In the
clash with the D Company platoon my caution in refusing the
direct order from Sergeant Mavin to return fire with the
M79
prevented the possible death or injury to D Company personnel.
And by not recognising the possible implications of not
indicating my section's position to the D Company soldiers when I
sighted them I endangered both platoons and showed a lack of
caution.
However it is the figure in the mist that has been
particularly troubling to me over the years, because there
were two distinct possibilities here:
(1) the figure in the
mist could have simply fired as I stepped in front of him
(2) and what is probably the most troubling and far from
unlikely as many of us would know, the 8 Platoon gunner
could have simply taken the option of self preservation—pulled the trigger and that would have taken care of
that. So in some instances, he is the
bravest man who does not fire.
During this period Lt R Wainwright was temporarily out of
action with a foot injury. I believe command of 8 Platoon
had been put into the hands of our platoon sergeant, Sgt Mavin so this incident
in no way reflects on the navigational abilities of our
erstwhile platoon leader and association president. In fact
I believe his absence may have led or at least contributed,
to the navigation error on 8 platoon's part. We in 8 Platoon were
never told the identity of the platoon in opposition. I
believe the main reasons for the lack of casualties were at
no time were the two forces within sight of each other, or
within 100 metres of each other and each was firing only at the
direction of incoming fire In the early days we tended get
a bit exited, fire high and last but not least...just pure
unadulterated good luck!
I have made every effort to determine the exact date of this
incident and identity of the opposing platoon via the daily
battalion situation reports now at the AWM but without
success. I also made a determined attempt to locate a diary.
This diary was kept by the former 8 Platoon 6 Section
Commander former Cpl Holger 'Çurly' Koblitz supposedly held
at the Vietnam Veterans' Museum on the Mornington Peninsula Victoria. But alas, so far
it has not been located. Any information from 5th Battalion
members regarding the identity of the opposing force in this
incident would be appreciated and can forward to the author
via the Webmaster. This information conditional for
publication or not as required.
