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© Brian London
OAM., DCM.
Both Tours |
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A
PLATOON COMMANDER'S VIEW
The
Fifth Battalion had returned to Nui Dat. Between
ready reaction tasks, company operations, convoy
protection and numerous other operational tasks, the
battalion was enjoying a break from full scale
operations. A Company was on two days leave in Vung
Tau, C and B Companies were involved in training
and D Company was the Ready Reaction Company. D
Company was enjoying the 'Break' with the
opportunity to get a decent nights sleep, wash some
clothes, write a letter home and have a hot meal—
without the need to be on constant alert against
enemy attack. On the morning of the 6th June 1969,
D Company members were looking forward to another
day of moderate activity. Few probably gave thought
to the date and the fact that on this day in 1944,
the D Day Invasion of Europe was well under way.
THE
VILLAGE OF BINH BA
Binh Ba village situated
some two miles north of the Task Force Area and on
the western side just off Route 2 and comprised of
around one thousand people in population—made up
of mainly farmers and rubber plantation workers. The
village houses was constructed of solid brick and
tile. The village was well known to the Australians
during the first tour and 5RAR stationed a rifle
company and a mortar section within the village.
This strategy proved to be a deterrent to the Viet
Cong tax collectors and assassination squads taking
control of the village. This however, was not to
continue. In 1969 as the drain on the meagre
resources of the Battalion proved to be too much and
the village was left to the protection of Regional
Forces.
THE
STAGE IS SET
On separate operations,
6RAR was engaged in a heavy contact with the enemy
several miles north of the Task Force Base. On the
morning of 6 June 1969 at 0800hrs, a Centurion Tank
and an armoured recovery vehicle moving through to
assist 6RAR were fired upon from Binh Ba village.
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
The initial intelligence
report indicated that two (2) enemy platoons had
infiltrated the village and the commander 1 ATF
decided to react Delta Company to the village.
THE
WARNING ORDER
The Ready Reaction
Force (on 30 Minutes notice to move), consisted of
D Company 5RAR, a troop of tanks and an APC Troop
(Armoured Personnel Carriers) were alerted to the
incident and prepared to move to the area. The Officer
commanding
D Company issued orders and the force moved off to
the village of Binh Ba.
D
COMPANY 5RAR
The company consisted of
3 platoons (10, 11 and 12 platoons) plus company HQ
(From this point on the account of the battle is
described by the platoon commander of 10 Platoon).
PLATOON COMMANDER 10 PLATOON:
"On
receiving the warning order, I mustered my men, in
all, 15 plus myself, a medic and a radio operator.
The usual platoon strength is 30 plus, so 10 platoon
was less than half strength."
ARRIVAL AT BINH BA VILLAGE (Time 1030 hrs)
"We
pulled up just clear of the village. The open
ground, cleared of trees some
300 yards from the
village perimeter, gave a clear view. From my
position, looking out from the open hatch of the
APC, I could see a lot of people, 30 or 40 running,
as if to take up defensive positions. The next
moment, several RPG (Rocket Propelled Grenades) smoke trails were heading in our
direction—all I wanted to do was to get out of the
APC—one hit from an RPG would kill or wound all
those aboard."
THE
MAIN BATTLE (Day 1)
With preparation from
helicopter gunships, (9 Squadron RAAF) D Company
assaulted the village. The formation was an extended
line with 10 Platoon Right flank, 11 Platoon and 12
Platoon taking the centre and Left flank positions.
Company HQ plus formed the reserve. The centurion
tanks were magnificent but they were no match
against concealed enemy firing RPG 7's. Within an
hour all three tanks were disabled due to damage and
crew casualties. The Officer commanding D Company
decided to move his force out of the village and
move to western side of Binh Ba. With a fresh troop
of tanks together with APC support, D Company
conducted a second assault on the village. Infantry
platoons led the assault; each platoon had one tank
and two APCs in close support.
A
CHANGE OF FORMATION
The OC, D Company sent a
radio message to the platoon commander 10 platoon.
"You
are not covering your objective, arrange your call
sign to do so."
I swore at the company
commander (under my breath) and decided to break my
platoon up into house clearing teams. This meant
five teams of two to three men. Platoon HQ would
form another team of two, myself and one other. We
still had the tank and two APCs but, control of the
platoon and the support vehicles would now pose a
problem.
HOUSE CLEARING BY TEAMS (Orders issued to 10
platoon)
"The
left clearing teams as well as the right clearing
teams will move one row of houses forward and remain
there. The centre clearing team, myself and the
radio operator, will clear the single centre row. I
will give the order to move forward and we will do
it all over again. If you get into trouble remember
we have a tank and two APCs at our rear, get word to
me by runner if you need them, any questions?"
With this
change, the platoon continued the advance. The
platoon made contact with the enemy immediately. The
opposing force occupied the houses and was firing
from the windows, doors and from any available
cover. One member of 10 Platoon, Pte Wayne Teeling
was shot through the neck as his team approached the
first line of houses.
The
platoon commander recalls:
"Cpl
Bamblett and I reached Pte Teeling but he was dead,
all we could do was to drag his body out of the line
of fire. Once this was done, I made contact with my
tank and tried to speak to the commander using the
phone at the rear of the vehicle—it wasn't working.
Climbing up to the hatch I made contact and directed
the vehicle commander to fire one round of H.E.
(High Explosive) into the building."
The house exploded and
the clearing team assaulted immediately. Six enemy
dead were found in the ruins. This type of action
was typical all along D Company's assault line. It
was made clear some time ago that the strength of
the enemy force was far greater than two platoons.
It was confirmed from captured documents that D
Company was facing elements of the 1st Battalion, 33
NVA Regiment. Enemy weapons littered the battle
ground. Some members of 10 platoon used discarded
AK47's to conserve their own ammunition.
The best laid plans of
mice and men rang true in this case. 10 platoon
groups were held up by enemy action. For example the
platoon commander of 10 platoon confronted two enemy
soldiers in one house—his centre clearing task. A
brisk exchange of fire resulted in two enemy dead
but, he also lost control of the platoon for about
15 minutes while this was going on. The other
clearing teams also confronted enemy firing rockets
and machinegun fire. 10 platoon teams were getting
in front of the other advancing platoons (11 and 12
Platoons) . The platoon commander added:
"It
took me 20 minutes to regain control of the platoon
and the lesson here is to lead, not to get involved
in a fire fight."
On one occasion the left
hand groups of 10 platoon were mistaken for the
enemy and attracted fire from one of our APCs.
To say that the battle,
which lasted for two days, was fierce and confusing
is an understatement.
1ST
BATTALION 33 NVA FORCES
Elements of the 1st
Battalion 33 NVA took up defensive positions within
the village and fought to the death. Other groups
discarded their uniforms and weapons and mingled
with the pockets of civilians unable to escape the
fighting. This added another dimension to the
conduct of the battle, and the soldiers of D
Company 5RAR exposed themselves to extreme danger
trying to usher these groups to the rear of the
battle zone. Other enemy groups tried to flee the
village, or hide in the small air raid bunkers
attached to every house. In one case, an enemy force
as large as an infantry company attempted to enter
the village to take part in the battle. In the
latter case these forces were met by B Company,
blocking the exit and entry routes outside Binh Ba.
To fully clear the village, every bunker, house and
any likely areas of concealment had to be searched.
In many cases face to face confrontations with the
enemy took place as this procedure was being carried
out.
THE
TRAGEDY OF WAR
On the second day, the
clearing of the village continued. D Company, with
a platoon from B Company did much the same as on
day one although, contact with the enemy focused on
small groups of NVA (North Vietnamese Army) still holed up in the village.
10 Platoon came across a women outside her house,
she was in a terrible state, crying and gesturing to
a partly collapsed bunker. A brief search by members
of 10 platoon resulted in a young male around 15
years of age, being pulled from the hole. He was in
a state of shock but no signs of physical injury.
Still crying, the women refused to leave and kept
pointing to the bunker. Further searching discovered
the body of a young girl; she had been blown in
half. We could do little to help the mother apart
from wrapping up the body of her dead daughter and
assist her and her son to reach a safe area to the
rear.
G. Johnson wrote
"I have seen a sight under heaven that only God
understands."
SUMMATION

The account of this
action is given by the platoon commander of 10
platoon. The intention is to describe the battle at
a platoon level and in some areas give an overall
view. It is not the intention to minimise or
overlook the participation of other elements of 5RAR
and supporting units involved in the engagement. The
battle was won by the successful co-operation
between units and sub units of the Task Force. For
example:
 |
B. Company
—Engaged enemy forces in a blocking
task around Binh Ba. Reacted to Duc Trung
against a large enemy force. Assisted D
Company with a platoon attached on day 2. |
 |
Assault Pioneer
Platoon— Reacted to Duc Trung. |
 |
C Company— Reacted to Hoa Long against an enemy force
of 50 plus. |
 |
Artillery and RAAF
Helicopter Gunships —Provided
invaluable support in and around Binh Ba,
Duc Trung and Hoa Long. |
 |
Armoured Units—Centurion Tanks from 1st Armoured Regiment
and Armoured Personnel Carriers from 3
Cavalry Regiment, provided protection,
firepower and mobility. Without their
support, the battle could not have been won. |
It is remarkable
given the battle conditions and, the strength of the
enemy force that more Australians were not killed or
wounded in the action.
 |
Australian Casualties—1 Killed in action and 8 wounded. {5RAR} |
 |
Viet Cong and 1st Battalion 33
NVA Regiment—126 killed in action |

Major Murray Blake was awarded Mentioned In Despatches
(MID) in this engagement. Read the citation accompanying
the award
Here

Sergeant Brian London was Awarded the Distinguished
Conduct Medal (DCM) in this engagement. Read the
citation accompanying the award
Here
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The battle concluded on the 8 June 1969.
A large enemy force had been defeated.
The battle for Binh Ba ranks as one of
the major military victories by the
Australian Task Force and is now part of
the battle honours of The Royal
Australian Regiment. |
Biblography
Video Cassette
The History of the Fifth Battalions VHS Colour, Copyright 1993, 5th
Battalion R.A.R. Association
M. R. Battle (1970) The Year of the Tigers, Sydney
Australia, Printcraft Press
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