The Accidental
Guerrilla;
Fighting Small Wars in the
Midst of a Big One
Author: David Kilcullen
Review by David Wilkins:
The
author, David Kilcullen, is a former Australian infantry
colonel who saw service in Indonesia, East Timor,
Cyprus, Bougainville, Iraq and Afghanistan. He was
“borrowed” by the US Defence Department where he worked
in the US think-tank for the past 5 years studying and
advising on counter terrorism and counterinsurgency. He
was involved with General David Petraeus’ successful
“surge” in Iraq in 2007 and is no doubt involved in the
current 2010 “surge” in Afghanistan.
This book recommends a new approach to counterinsurgency
strategy, not least against the al Qa’ida in Iraq,
Afghanistan and the North West Frontier of Pakistan. His
underlying thesis is that terrorist organisations such
as al Qa’ida (AQ) and Jema’ah Islamiyah (JI) (a South
East Asian offshoot of AQ) rely upon gaining the support
of the local populations in countries such as Iraq,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia, The Philippines,
Somalia, Southern Thailand and many more. When Western
nations like the USA pursue the terrorists into such
countries the local population perceives that presence
as an alien intrusion into their sovereign space. Not
surprisingly they often react in opposition to such
intrusion and so “by accident” become guerrillas who are
then exploited and utilised by the true terrorist
organisation.
The traditional Western approach (of the Americans at
least) in recent years has been to focus predominantly
on the enemy, that is, to pursue and kill him and
destroy his network. This is the “enemy-centric”
approach, a response that historically has not seen
great success. Kilcullen suggests an alternative
“population-centric” approach, akin to the
counterinsurgency methods that emerged in places like
Malaya in the 1950s and 60s where the British and
Australians did see success. This “population-centric”
approach focuses on the local population, seeking to
protect it from the terrorist organisation by
establishing close links with the locals and gaining
their confidence, and thereby their support. This
strategy requires more than a military “sweep” through a
populated area to rid it of enemy who will simply
side-step the push and return when the Western force has
moved on. There is a need to stay, consolidate and
provide on-going support for the locals, all the time
building them up so they become self-sufficient in
defending themselves. This concept of remaining and
consolidating has the effect of excluding the insurgent
who gradually becomes irrelevant to the local
population. When he attacks he is seen as the bad guy
and, providing the locals can protect themselves, the
insurgent loses his power and control as well as the
sympathy of the villagers.
In the words of an Afghan provincial governor:
“Ninety percent
of the people you call “Taliban” are actually tribals.
They’re fighting for loyalty or Pashtun honour, and to
profit their tribe. They’re not extremists. But they’re
terrorized by the other 10 percent: religious fanatics,
terrorists, people allied to [the Taliban leadership in]
Quetta. They’re afraid that if they try to reconcile,
the crazies will kill them. To win them over, first you
have to protect their people, and prove that the
extremists can’t hurt them if they come to your side.”
This is a very brief and simplistic summary of a most
complicated subject, which the author analyses in an
academic way but from a practical veteran’s perspective.
He illustrates his thesis with many colourful
battlefield experiences from around the Globe, ranging
from the jungles and highlands of South-East Asia and
the mountains of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to the
dusty towns of the Middle East. It is however, a book of
strategy not of tactics.
The author cautions that there is no fixed rule for
counterinsurgency as the circumstances are forever
changing and shifting, necessitating dynamic responses.
David Kilcullen has become one of the world's most
influential analysts of counterinsurgency and modern
warfare. I consider his book to be an important text
describing a fresh approach, and should be required
reading for every modern strategist and soldier, not
just the decision-makers but also those involved at the
grassroots level.
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