

AN INFANTRY PLATOON'S
PERSPECTIVE
©
Brian London OAM., DCM
Both Tours |
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Mine
Clearing Teams searching for mines in Dat Do
The village of
Dat Do located south-east of the Australian
task force base was well known as an hostile
VC Village. The population contained a high
percentage of VC families, Viet Cong
infrastructure and sympathisers willing to
live in co-existence with each other. 5 RAR
along with a troop of tanks from 1st
Armoured Regiment, armoured personnel
carriers from B Squadron 3rd Cavalry and 2
Troop 1 Field Squadron Engineers were on 'Operation
Esso' in the Dat Do District. As part of
this operation.
D. Company was allocated the task of
relieving a company of 9 RAR who had
concluded their operations in Dat Do
Village. D. Company arrived in Dat Do by
APCs and proceeded to deploy as a company in
a vacant block within the village. The
company commander directed his platoons to
take up their positions within the defensive
harbour (circular defensive position) . 10
platoon led and began to deploy from 12
o'clock through to 4 o'clock, 12 platoon,
commanded by Sgt. Rod Lees, began to deploy
his troops from 8 to 12 o'clock. 11 Platoon
was to fill in remainder of the defensive
position.
It was
during the harbour routine that Sgt. Lees stepped on a
M16 Mine. The sound of
the explosion died away leaving only the lingering pall
of black and gray smoke in the air. The commander of 10
Platoon ordered his men to stay where they were and not
to move. The platoon commander of 10 platoon recalls
"I moved towards Rod's position and saw at least two
of his platoon were dead and most of the remainder were
wounded. On reaching Rod I saw that he was so badly
wounded, I gave him no chance of survival."
(Sgt. Rod Lees miraculously survived
his horrendous wounds). In a single mine explosion D.
Company had lost almost a complete platoon. It was later
discovered that two more mines were planted in the
vacant block, one had malfunctioned the second by
another miracle, was not stepped on.
On
completion of the evacuation of the dead and wounded, D.
Company occupied a firm base and prepared to continue
the operation. The commander of 10 Platoon was given the
task of ambushing in the village on night one. It is
usual for the ambush commander to conduct a detailed
reconnaissance of the ambush site however, this was not
possible due to the certain observation by the
inhabitants of the village. A drive around the village
with the company commander and passing through the
proposed site (a cross road) was the only reconnaissance
carried out.
The other
problem was being observed setting up the ambush. The
only solution was to wait until after curfew and place
the troops in the ambush site after dark. The platoon
set out at last light and proceeded to the ambush area.
On reaching the site, it was discovered that the cross
roads were over grown in some places and not suitable. A
new site had to be found and the commander decided to
move to the next road junction . The new site was better
suited to the task although there was not a lot of room
and some of the ambush party would be in the front yard
of one house. Time was running out (2000Hrs) and the
chances of contacting the enemy whilst still setting the
ambush increased by the minute. Trip flares were set
along with claymore mines and the platoon placed in
their final positions. After a period of time steady
rain set in, the commander took a moment to look at his
watch, it was 2230 Hrs. Concentrating again on the
approaches the commander could just make out the outline
of figures moving into the ambush area. They were only
metres away. Counting six enemy with more behind, the
commander waited for the inevitable. Seconds later the
trip flares went off followed by machine gun and rifle
fire. The enemy dead were falling only a few feet from
the 10 Platoon groups.
A radio
message was sent to company HQ (contact report)
informing them of the contact details. It was not
possible to give an accurate report on enemy dead at
that time and the ambush commander decided not to
conduct a search by torch light for fear of exposing the
search party to danger from any enemy still alive. The
decision was also made to remain in the ambush site
until first light and to recover the dead at that time.
The
platoon remained on 100% alert but, it was not over yet.
At 0300 hrs firing broke out again and an explosion
occurred within the platoon position severely wounding
two members of 10 Platoon. The enemy broke contact after
this second encounter and the ambush party had no choice
but to abandon the position. The main problem was how to
evacuate the wounded? A helicopter was out of the
question. The radio which was working well before was
now jammed with interference (enemy interference or not
is unknown) The radio frequency was switched to the
Mortar Net and although interference was present, the
call for assistance got through. A vehicle was sent from
the firm base and the wounded were loaded and escorted
back by 10 Platoon.
Once back
at the base camp, the ambush commander was debriefed by
the OC D. Company. There was just enough time to issue
new orders to section commanders including Support
Section, (now attached to 10 Platoon) and return to the
ambush site before first light.
Once
again the platoon set out to revisit an area and a
situation only vacated a short time ago. Through the
mist of first light the party approached the ambush site
and before them lay the bodies of six enemy dead. One of
the dead was dressed in South Vietnamese uniform
complete with U.S. rifle and pack. At least two enemy
escaped.
"It was
not so much the number of enemy, moreover, who they
were. The documents taken from the bodies identified
them as senior ranking officials of the Dat Do Village
Cadre and is probably the reason for the return of the
enemy at 0300 hrs."—The ambush commander
QUESTIONS
Why did
the enemy Cadre take such a risk in moving on that night
in June 1969?
POSSIBLE ENEMY SCENARIO
(Enemy Appreciation)
1. The
operations of 9 RAR had contained the movement of their
forces from within the village and stymied village
access to their main forces outside.
2. The
relieving Australian force had suffered heavy casualties
in the mined area and would be incapable or, at least
unwilling to conduct ambush operations to-night.
3. This
would be the best time to re-establish contact with main
forces outside Dat Do that is, before the relieving
Australian unit has time to recover and regroup.
CONCLUSION (Possible)
The
Village Cadre will re-establish contact with their main
forces to-night with the objective to plan future
operations, organise the supply of essential items and
provide intelligence on enemy forces.
Like so many soldiers on that day, they didn't
make it.

CASUALTIES OPERATION "ESSO" 15 JUNE -15 JULY
BOTH
SIDES
AUSTRALIAN - 9 KILLED IN ACTION - 58 WOUNDED
U.S. - 2 KILLED IN ACTION
VIETNAMESE ARVN - 3 KILLED IN ACTION-13 WOUNDED
ENEMY - 29 KILLED IN ACTION- 30 WOUNDED
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